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Searches of the Person:
A New Approach to Electronic Device Searches at
Canadian Customs
Justin Doll*

1.

INTRODUCTION

What goes through your mind at customs? As you wait in that folded line,
edging closer to a row of enclosed booths manned by uniformed officers,
surrounded by security cameras and warning signs? Perhaps you’re trying to act
naturally, then wondering if it shows? Perhaps you’re mentally recalculating the
amount you’ve scribbled onto your customs declaration? Or perhaps you’re
exhausted from your flight, maybe nursing a bit of a hangover, not thinking
about much at all? When you finally get to the front of the line, how do you
expect your conversation with the customs officer to go?
According to Canadian law, one thing that you have in this moment,
whether you’re thinking about it or not, is an expectation of privacy. And if
search and seizure law can be distilled into a single question, it is whether your
expectation of privacy is reasonable at any given moment. This paper discusses
the expectation of privacy that travellers have at Canadian customs with respect
to their electronic devices.
The paper proceeds first with an examination of two foundational Supreme
Court of Canada cases, Hunter and Simmons. The paper then examines how the
lower courts have interpreted these foundational cases so as to apply to searches
of electronic devices (something not anticipated by the foundational cases
themselves, which were decided in the 1980s). The paper then discusses more
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing the unique privacy
considerations posed by modern technology outside of the customs context.
The paper then examines different proposals for modifying the way that device
searches are conducted at customs in order to comport with this more recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Finally, the paper concludes by offering a new
proposal for change, which relies heavily on a reassessment of the foundational
cases.
In short, travellers have strong privacy interests in their devices, and customs
searches should not be undertaken as a routine matter. Through either revised
legislation or judicial interpretation, device searches at Canadian customs should
be treated as being analogous to ‘‘searches of the person.” As such, a device
search at customs (a) should require that a customs officer form a ‘‘reasonable
suspicion” of a contravention of customs law before initiating a search, (b)
should be subject to a traveller’s right to request a review of the custom officer’s
*
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decision to initiate the search, and (c) should be subject to a traveller’s right to
speak to legal counsel prior to the initiation of the search.

2.

THE FOUNDATIONAL CASES

The case of Hunter v. Southam1 was the first time that the Supreme Court of
Canada considered the effect of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 on
federal legislation authorizing search and seizure, and it is particularly notable
for articulating the well-known criminal search standard of ‘‘reasonable and
probable grounds.” It remains the leading case on Charter protection against
search and seizure.3 The case of R. v. Simmons,4 heard four years after Hunter,
was the first time that the Supreme Court considered the effect of the Charter on
Canadian customs searches,5 and it remains the leading case in that regard.6
Together, Hunter and Simmons provide the constitutional foundation for the
modern approach to device searches at customs.

a.

Hunter v. Southam

Although Hunter was not itself a customs case, Justice Dickson’s discussion
in Hunter about the appropriate ‘‘procedural safeguards” against unreasonable
search and seizure weighed heavily on Simmons, as well as post-Simmons customs
case law. In Hunter, officers attempted to execute a search at the business
premises of the Edmonton Journal (a division of the named party Southam),
pursuant to a sweeping ‘‘certified authorization” granted by the Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission (the predecessor to the Competition Tribunal).
Southam challenged the statutory provisions authorizing the search,7 which were
found to be unconstitutional, and therefore inoperable, by the Alberta Court of
Appeal. Justice Dickson (as he was then), writing for a unanimous Supreme
Court, upheld the decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal.
Justice Dickson observed that the section 8 could be expressed not only as an
individual’s ‘‘negative” right to protection against ‘‘unreasonable search and
seizure,” but also as an individual’s ‘‘positive” right to a ‘‘reasonable expectation
1

2

3
4
5

6

7

Canada (Director of Investigation Research, Combines Investigation Branch) v. Southam
Inc., 1984 CarswellAlta 121, (sub nom. Hunter v. Southam Inc.) [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145
(S.C.C.) [Hunter].
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11 [Charter].
R. v. Oliynyk, 2005 BCSC 1895, 2005 CarswellBC 3611 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 17.
R. v. Simmons, 1988 CarswellOnt 91, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 (S.C.C.) [Simmons].
On the same date as Simmons, the Supreme Court also heard the case of R. v. Jacoy, 1988
CarswellBC 1314, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 548 (S.C.C.), which also involved the seizure of
narcotics at an airport.
Robert Currie, ‘‘Electronic Devices at the Border: The Next Frontier of Canadian Search
and Seizure Law?” (2016) 14:2 CJLT 289 at 298.
Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, ss. 10(2) and 10(3).
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of privacy.”8 In any given situation, the determination of the reasonableness of
an expectation of privacy would involve balancing the interests of the individual
(such as the interest in being left alone, or, in more serious cases, the interest in
bodily integrity) against the interests of the state (such as its interest in law
enforcement or, in more serious cases, its interest in state security). 9 This
‘‘balance of interests” involved the consideration of potential ‘‘procedural
safeguards” against state overreach, such as (a) prior authorization, (b) judicial
authorization, and (c) objective standards.10
With respect to (a) prior authorization, Justice Dickson stated that section 8
strongly favoured a ‘‘means of preventing unjustified searches before they
happen” rather than simply ‘‘determining, after the fact, whether they ought to
have occurred in the first place.”11 Prior authorization was usually accomplished
‘‘in the form of a valid warrant,” which put ‘‘the onus on the state to
demonstrate the superiority of its interest to that of the individual.” 12 While not
always possible to obtain prior authorization, ‘‘where it is feasible [. . .] such
authorization is a precondition for a valid search and seizure.”13
With respect to (b) judicial authorization, Justice Dickson observed that it
mattered not only when authorization to perform a search occurred, but also who
granted authorization to perform the search. In other words, ‘‘it is necessary for
the person authorizing the search to be able to assess the evidence as to whether
that standard has been met, in an entirely neutral and impartial manner.” 14
While it may be preferable for the authorizer to be a judge (as in the case of a
criminal search warrant), this was not a ‘‘necessary precondition,” as long as the
authorizer was ‘‘capable of acting judicially.”15 One way to assess whether the
authorizer was acting judicially was to examine whether the authorizer was
performing an ‘‘investigatory rather than adjudicatory” function.16 In the case
before him, Justice Dickson observed that the ‘‘significant investigatory
functions” of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission had the result of
‘‘vitiating the ability of a member of the Commission to act in a judicial capacity
when authorizing a search or seizure” (although Justice Dickson was careful to
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16

Hunter, supra note 1 at para. 25.
Ibid at paras. 25—26, 42.
Hunter, supra note 1. Justice Dickson attributes the phrase ‘‘procedural safeguards” to
Justice Prowse of the Alberta Court of Appeal (para 11, aff’g 1983 ABCA 32). In his own
analysis, Justice Dickson weighs the appropriate procedural safeguards by posing three
questions: ‘‘[w]hen is the balance of interests to be assessed” (paras 27-31); ‘‘[w]ho must
grant the authorization” (paras 32-36); and ‘‘[o]n what basis must the balance of interests
be assessed” (paras 37-43).
Ibid at para. 27.
Ibid at para. 28.
Ibid at para. 29.
Ibid at para 32.
Ibid.
Ibid at para. 34.
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add that this was not ‘‘a matter if impugning the honesty or good faith of the
Commission or its members”).17
With respect to (c) objective standards, Justice Dickson observed that it
mattered not only when authorization occurred, or who granted authorization,
but also what standard was applied in determining whether authorization should
be granted. Justice Dickson remarked that it was untenable to leave the search
standard entirely to the ‘‘subjective appreciation of individual adjudicators” and
found that some ‘‘objective standard must be established.”18 Justice Dickson
rejected the search standard proposed by the appellant Restrictive Trade
Practices Commission (authorizing a search if there was a reasonable belief as to
the ‘‘possible existence of relevant evidence”) as being ‘‘a very low standard
which would validate intrusion on the basis of suspicion, and authorize fishing
expeditions of considerable latitude.”19 Instead, Justice Dickson mandated the
search standard of ‘‘reasonable and probable grounds, established upon oath, to
believe that an offence has been committed and that there is evidence to be found
at the place of the search” as the ‘‘minimum standard” for cases such as the one
before him.20

b.

R. v. Simmons

In Simmons, the accused, Ms. Simmons, arrived in Toronto on a flight from
Jamaica.21 She was subjected to a ‘‘strip-search” by customs officers, which
revealed six bags of hashish oil fastened to her midriff with plastic bandages. She
was arrested and charged with importing narcotics. At trial, Ms. Simmons
argued, amongst other things, that her Charter rights had been violated (a)
because she was not informed of her right to contact legal counsel prior to being
subjected to a strip-search, and (b) because the customs legislation authorizing
her strip search had required something less than the procedural safeguards
outlined in Hunter.22
The trial judge agreed that the strip-search violated Ms. Simmons’s Charter
rights. The narcotics evidence discovered as result of the illegal search was
excluded, and Ms. Simmons was acquitted. On appeal, the Ontario Court of
Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.23 On further appeal, Chief
Justice Dickson, writing on behalf of the majority of the Supreme Court, found
that, although Ms. Simmons’s Charter rights had been violated, the narcotics
17
18
19
20
21
22

23

Ibid at para 35.
Ibid at para 41.
Ibid at para 42.
Ibid at para 43.
Supra note 4.
R. v. Simmons, 1983 CarswellOnt 1471 (Ont. Co. Ct.), reversed 1984 CarswellOnt 46
(Ont. C.A.), affirmed 1988 CarswellOnt 91, 1988 CarswellOnt 968 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Simmons, 1984 CarswellOnt 46, 45 O.R. (2d) 609 (Ont. C.A.), affirmed 1988
CarswellOnt 91, 1988 CarswellOnt 968 (S.C.C.).
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evidence should not have been excluded.24 He upheld the Court of Appeal’s
decision to order a new trial.
The operative legislation at the time of Ms. Simmons’s arrest was the 1970
version of the Customs Act.25 Section 143 provides that a customs officer may
search a person entering Canada if the officer ‘‘has reasonable cause to suppose
that the person searched has goods subject to entry at the customs, or prohibited
goods, secreted about his person.” And section 144 provides that a person being
searched ‘‘may require the officer to take him before a police magistrate or justice
of the peace, or before the collector or chief officer at the port or place, who
shall, if he sees no reasonable cause for search, discharge the person.”
Although there is only one search standard articulated in sections 143 and
144 — ‘‘reasonable cause to suppose” — Chief Justice Dickson famously found
that there were in fact three distinct types of customs searches:
30 It is, I think, of importance that the cases and the literature seem to
recognize three distinct types of border search. First is the routine of
questioning, which every traveller undergoes at a port of entry,
accompanied in some cases by a search of baggage and perhaps a pat or
frisk of outer clothing. No stigma is attached to being one of the
thousands of travellers who are daily routinely checked in that manner
upon entry to Canada, and no constitutional issues are raised. It would
be absurd to suggest that a person in such circumstances is “detained”
in a constitutional sense, and therefore entitled to be advised of his or
her right to counsel. The second type of border search is the strip or
skin-search, of the nature of that to which the present appellant was
subjected, conducted in a private room, after a secondary examination
and with the permission of a customs officer in authority. The third and
most highly intrusive type of search is that sometimes referred to as the
“body cavity search”, in which customs officers have recourse to
medical doctors, to X-rays, to emetics, and to other highly invasive
means.
31 I wish to make it clear that each of the different types of search raises
different issues. We are here concerned with searches of the second
type, and what I have to say relates only to that type of search. Searches
of the third, or bodily cavity, type may raise entirely different
constitutional issues, for it is obvious that the greater the intrusion,
the greater must be the justification and the greater the degree of
constitutional protection.

The first issue (whether Ms. Simmons should have had the opportunity to
speak to legal counsel prior to her strip-search) engaged section 10 of the
Charter, which provides that, upon ‘‘arrest or detention,” a person has the right
to ‘‘retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right.”
24
25

Supra note 4.
Customs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-40 [Customs Act 1970].
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Chief Justice Dickson found that, when Ms. Simmons was required to undergo a
strip-search, the ‘‘customs officer had assumed control over her movements by a
demand which had significant legal consequences,” which amounted to a
‘‘detention,” which in turn triggered Ms. Simmons’s right to instruct counsel
prior to the strip-search.26
The second issue (as to whether sections 143 and 144 set out appropriate
search standards) engaged section 8 of the Charter. On one hand, Chief Justice
Dickson noted that sections 143 and 144 clearly did not meet the high standards
that had been outlined in Hunter: prior authorization was not mandatory
(although, notably, a review would occur upon request); there was no warrant
requirement; and the standard of ‘‘reasonable cause to suppose” fell short of the
standard of ‘‘reasonable and probable grounds established on oath.”27 On the
other hand, Chief Justice Dickson noted that that the ‘‘reasonable expectation of
privacy” of a person at Canadian customs differed from the ‘‘reasonable
expectation of privacy” of a person in ‘‘most other situations.” 28 This difference
owed to the fact that (a) ‘‘travellers seeking to cross national boundaries fully
expect to be subject to a screening process,” and (b) states have important
interests in ‘‘preventing the entry of undesirable persons and prohibited goods,
and in protecting tariff revenue.”29 Thus, unlike Hunter, Chief Justice Dickson
concluded that sections 143 and 144 were constitutional.
However, Chief Justice Dickson went on to conclude that, in the specific case
of Ms. Simmons, customs officers had misapplied sections 143 and 144, causing a
breach of her section 8 rights. Ms. Simmons had a right to know about the
customs officers’ scope of authority to conduct the strip search, and she had a
right to know about her option to request a review of the custom officers’
decision to initiate the search.30 Customs officers had failed to directly inform
Ms. Simmons about her rights, and she had also been deprived of the
opportunity to learn about her rights by speaking to counsel. Unfortunately
for Ms. Simmons, while Chief Justice Dickson found that Ms. Simmons’s section
8 and section 10 rights had been breached by the strip-search, he also found that
there were ample ‘‘objective, articulable facts” to ‘‘support the customs officer’s
suspicion that [Ms. Simmons] was concealing something on her body.” 31
Accordingly, Justice Dickson concluded that excluding the narcotics evidence
‘‘would bring the administration of justice into disrepute,” pursuant to section 24
of the Charter, and he therefore declined to do so.
Notably, by the time that Ms. Simmons’s appeal reached the Supreme
Court,32 the Customs Act 1970 had been repealed and replaced by a new version
26
27
28
29
30
31

Simmons, supra note 4 at para. 38.
Ibid at para. 45.
Ibid at para. 49.
Ibid at paras 51-52.
Ibid at paras 57—58, 62.
Ibid at 67.
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of the Customs Act, which came into force in 1986 (after Ms. Simmons’s arrest). 33
With respect to searches of the person, section 98 of the Customs Act 1986
replaced sections 143-144 of the Customs Act 1970.34 With respect to searches of
goods, section 99 of the Customs Act 1986 replaced section 133 of the Customs
Act 1970.35 The old and new Customs Act provisions respecting searches of the
person are similar, with the notable difference that section 98 significantly
narrows the scope of who may review a search decision to simply ‘‘the senior
officer at the place where the search is to take place” (from a police magistrate,
justice of the peace, or chief officer, according to the predecessor section). The
provisions respecting searches of ‘‘goods” are also similar, with the notable
difference that section 99(1) does not require an officer to have ‘‘reasonable
grounds of suspicion” before initiating a search.

3. EARLY INTERPRETATIONS: ELECTRONIC DEVICES ARE
‘‘GOODS”
Citing Simmons, courts have tended to broadly construe the types of
activities falling within first-level searches. For example, in R. v. Nagle, the
British Columbia Court of Appeal found that the ‘‘search of a purse, in the
context of a border crossing, is part of the routine screening procedure.”36
Similarly, in R. v. Hudson, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that ‘‘asking the
respondent to turn his pockets inside out was no more invasive than a search of
baggage, or a purse, or a pat down or frisk of outer clothing.”37
32
33

34

35

36

Ibid at para. 8.
Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.) [formerly Customs Act, S.C. 1986, c. 1]
[Customs Act 1986].
With respect to searches of the person, the provision that a search may be initiated if an
officer ‘‘has reasonable cause to suppose” that a person has secreted prohibited goods
(section 143) was replaced with the provision that a search may be initiated ‘‘if the officer
suspects on reasonable grounds” that a person has secreted prohibited goods, or secreted
evidence of some contravention of customs legislation, on their person (section 98(1)).
The provision allowing a person to request a review of a search decision to a ‘‘police
magistrate or justice of the peace” or ‘‘collector or chief officer at the port or place”
(section 144) was replaced with a provision allowing for review by ‘‘the senior officer at
the place where the search is to take place” (section 98(2)).
With respect to the search of goods, the provision that an officer may ‘‘upon information,
or upon reasonable grounds of suspicion, detain, open and examine any package
suspected to contain prohibited property or smuggled goods, or goods respecting which
there has been any violation of any of the requirements of this Act” (section 133(1)) was
replaced with the provision that an officer may ‘‘examine any goods that have been
imported and open or cause to be opened any package or container of imported goods
and take samples of imported goods in reasonable amounts” (section 99(1)(a)). With
respect to ‘‘mail,” an officer may open ‘‘any such mail that the officer suspects on
reasonable grounds” contains prohibited goods (section 99(1)(b)).
R. v. Nagle, 2012 BCCA 373, 2012 CarswellBC 2859 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 75, leave to
appeal refused 2013 CarswellBC 685, 2013 CarswellBC 686 (S.C.C.).
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In early cases involving the status of electronic devices at the border, the
courts continued to broadly construe first-level searches so as to include device
searches. In R. v. Leask, a customs officer turned on Mr. Leask’s laptop,
performed a ‘‘routine border search” (clicked through the electronic folders), and
discovered child pornography.38 At trial, the Ontario Court of Justice concluded
that the non-destructive search of the accused’s laptop, which ‘‘required no
special equipment or expertise,” fell within the ambit of a first-level search, as
defined by Simmons:
16 Moreover, any search at the border of one’s pockets, carryall or
baggage could result in all manner of personal and private items being
surveyed or touched by a stranger and resulting in some level of
embarrassment or a feeling of discomfort. I see no intrinsic difference
between the effects of the computer search at issue here and the
intrusiveness or the embarrassment attendant upon a search of a wallet
or purse or the requirement to turn out of one’s pockets or to be
subjected to a detailed examination of the contents of one’s suitcase. In
my view the search of Mr. Leask’s computer was a routine border
search that did not infringe his s. 8 Charter rights.

Leask has been followed, or cited with approval, in a number of subsequent
cases. In R. v. Whittaker, the New Brunswick Provincial Court found that ‘‘a
computer file such as the digital storage of photographic images is a document
and falls squarely within the definition of ‘goods’ as that term is used in the
Customs Act.”39 In R. v. Appleton, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found
that a ‘‘Blackberry” was analogous to a briefcase, and that a ‘‘text message” was
analogous to a ‘‘letter from a friend,” all of which fell under the ambit of a firstlevel search.40 In R. v. Moroz, the Ontario Superior of Justice found that ‘‘the
cursory view of [the accused’s] cell-phone or I-Phone was merely to review and
peruse electronic information that may assist custom officials in their
determination whether any illegal materials or ‘goods’ are concealed by the
individual.”41 Finally, in R. v. Buss, a customs officer turned on the accused’s
laptop and ‘‘pushed Windows and the F key and searched for jpgs, j pegs, a
commonly used photo format,” which the British Columbia Provincial Court
found fell within the ambit of a first-level search.42 Whittaker, Moroz, and Buss
were child pornography cases, while Appleton involved the discovery of text
messages that discussed smuggling a handgun into Canada.
37
38
39

40
41

42

R. v. Hudson, 2005 CarswellOnt 7378, 77 O.R. (3d) 561 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 38.
R. v. Leask, 2008 ONCJ 25, 2008 CarswellOnt 415 (Ont. C.J.) [Leask].
R. v. Whittaker, 2010 NBPC 32, 2010 CarswellNB 489 (N.B. Prov. Ct.) at para. 8
[Whittaker].
R. v. Appleton, 2011 CarswellOnt 11191 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 12 [Appleton].
R. v. Moroz, 2012 ONSC 5642, 2012 CarswellOnt 12614 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 21
[Morosz].
R. v. Buss, 2014 BCPC 16, 2014 CarswellBC 485 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) at para. 15 [Buss].
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4. RECOGNIZING THE UNIQUE NATURE OF ELECTRONIC
DEVICES
Interestingly, at roughly the same time that the lower courts were broadly
construing the search authority of customs officers with respect to electronic
devices, the Supreme Court of Canada began to narrow the search authority of
police officers with respect to electronic devices. Out of Justice Dickson’s finding
in Hunter that section 8 of the Charter afforded a positive right to a ‘‘reasonable
expectation of privacy,” the Supreme Court developed, primarily through cases
dealing with different types of police searches, a four-factor test to determine the
nature and scope of a person’s expectation of privacy.43 First, the court should
define the ‘‘subject matter” of the search. Second, the court should ask whether
the claimant had a ‘‘direct interest” in the subject matter. Third, the court should
ask whether the claimant has ‘‘a subjective expectation of privacy” in the subject
matter. Finally, the court should ask whether the claimant’s ‘‘subjective
expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable.” In applying this test, the
Supreme Court has increasingly recognized that device searches engage unique
privacy interests, which often require a higher degree of protection than searches
of other objects or areas.
In the watershed44 case of R. v Morelli, Justice Fish quashed the accused’s
conviction for possession of child pornography, citing deficiencies in a police
search warrant executed with respect to the accused’s home and computer. 45 In
doing so, Justice Fish suggested that searching an accused’s home and computer
was more invasive than only searching an accused’s home:
105 As I mentioned at the outset, it is difficult to imagine a more
intrusive invasion of privacy than the search of one’s home and
personal computer. Computers often contain our most intimate
correspondence. They contain the details of our financial, medical,
and personal situations. They even reveal our specific interests, likes,
and propensities, recording in the browsing history and cache files the
information we seek out and read, watch, or listen to on the Internet.

In R. v. Vu, Justice Cromwell expanded upon Justice Fish’s observations in
Morelli, finding, definitively, that a warrant authorizing police to search a home
did not also authorize police to search a computer located within that home. 46 In
that case, police searched electronic devices, which had in turn been discovered
during the search of a grow-op residence, and retrieved electronic information
43

44

45
46

R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53, 2012 CarswellOnt 12684 (S.C.C.) at para. 40 [Cole]; R. v.
Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, 2017 CarswellOnt 19341 (S.C.C.) at paras. 8 - 12 [Marakah]; R. v.
Reeves, 2018 SCC 56, 2018 CarswellOnt 20930 (S.C.C.) at para. 28 [Reeves]; R. v. Mills,
2019 SCC 22, 2019 CarswellNfld 161 (S.C.C.) at para. 13 [Mills].
So noted in R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, 2014 CarswellOnt 17202 (S.C.C.) at para. 188
[Fearon].
R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, 2010 CarswellSask 150 (S.C.C.) at para. 4 [Morelli].
R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60, 2013 CarswellBC 3342 (S.C.C.) [Vu].
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that allowed them to identify, and charge, the accused with drug-related offences.
Justice Cromwell opined that computer searches were ‘‘markedly different” from
searches of other ‘‘receptacles,” such as ‘‘cupboards and filing cabinets,” in four
specific ways: (a) immense informational storage capacity (which may touch on
an individual’s ‘‘biographical core of personal information”); (b) automatic or
inadvertent data retention; (c) data retention after apparent deletion; and (d)
interconnectivity of data stored in multiple ‘‘locations.”47 As such, ‘‘prior
authorization” (as mandated by Hunter) needed to be assessed separately with
respect to general searches and computer searches, requiring police to ‘‘first
satisfy the authorizing justice that they have reasonable grounds to believe that
any computers they discover will contain the things they are looking for” before
such computers could be searched.48
In R. v. Spencer, Justice Cromwell clarified and expanded upon his reasoning
in Vu, noting that, when identifying the subject matter of an alleged search (the
first part of the four-factor test), the court ‘‘must not do so narrowly in terms of
the physical acts involved or the physical space invaded, but rather by reference
to the nature of the privacy interests potentially compromised.”49 In Spencer, the
‘‘subject matter” of the alleged search was found to be ‘‘the identity of a
subscriber whose Internet connection is linked to a particular, monitored
Internet activity [i.e. downloading child pornography],”50 as opposed to simply
‘‘a name and address of someone in a contractual relationship with [the internet
service provider].”51 Thus, Justice Cromwell concluded that a specific warrant
was required not only for police to seize and search a personal computer (his
finding in Vu), but that a specific warrant was required for police to request,
from an internet service provider, the subscriber information that was associated
with an ISP address.
In R. v. Fearon, the issue before the court was the constitutionality of
electronic device searches ‘‘incident to arrest.”52 Notably, at least for the
purposes of this paper, the Supreme Court directly compared these types of
searches to ‘‘strip searches.” In that case, the police obtained evidence that
implicated the accused in an armed robbery by searching the accused’s
smartphone, which had itself been discovered during a pat-down search after
the accused had been arrested. Justice Cromwell found that Mr. Fearon’s
Charter rights had been breached, although Justice Cromwell ultimately declined
to exclude the cellphone evidence and upheld the accused’s conviction. Justice
Karakatsanis, writing in dissent, would have excluded the cellphone evidence.

47
48
49
50
51
52

Ibid at paras. 25, 40—45.
Ibid at para 48.
R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, 2014 CarswellSask 342 (S.C.C.) at para. 31 [Spencer].
Ibid at para 33.
Ibid at para 32.
Fearon, supra note 44.
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Justice Cromwell noted, by way of comparison, that strip searches could be
performed by police when they are ‘‘incident to a lawful arrest for the purpose of
discovering weapons in the detainee’s possession or evidence related to the
reasons for the arrest” and the police ‘‘have reasonable and probable grounds for
concluding that a strip search is necessary in the particular circumstances of the
arrest.”53 Although Justice Cromwell affirmed the unique privacy interests at
stake with respect to the search of electronic devices, he ultimately concluded
that these interests were less significant than those associated with strip searches,
stating that the latter ‘‘are invariably and inherently very great invasions of
privacy and are, in addition, a significant affront to human dignity.” 54
Accordingly, Justice Cromwell outlined a somewhat less stringent, 4-part, test
for the search of an electronic device incident to arrest, requiring: (a) a lawful
arrest, (b) a valid law enforcement purpose to search the device (such as safety or
the preservation of evidence), (c) a tailoring of the nature and extent of the search
to the scope of the search, and (d) detailed note taking by police.55
Unlike Justice Cromwell, Justice Karakatsanis suggested that ‘‘like the
search of a private home, a strip search or the seizure of bodily samples, the
search of the portal to our digital existence is invasive and impacts major privacy
interests.”56 She concluded that police should be required to obtain a warrant to
search a cellphone incident to arrest, except when ‘‘(1) there is a reasonable basis
to suspect that a search may prevent an imminent threat to safety or (2) there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the imminent loss or destruction of evidence
may be prevented by a warrantless search.”57
In R. v. Marakah, Chief Justice McLachlin strongly affirmed Justice
Cromwell’s characterization of the ‘‘subject matter” of the search, noting that
‘‘[t]he subject matter of a search must be defined functionally, not in terms of
physical acts, physical space, or modalities of transmission.”58 In that case, police
obtained text messages between the accused and his accomplice, from a search of
the accomplice’s iPhone, implicating the accused in firearms-related offences.
Chief Justice McLachlin declined to characterize the ‘‘subject matter” of the
search to be simply the accomplice’s iPhone, since ‘‘[n]either the iPhone itself nor
its contents generally is what the police were really after.” 59 Rather, (1) the
subject matter of the search was the ‘‘electronic conversation” between the
accused and the accomplice;60 (2) the accused obviously had a direct interest in
53
54
55
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Ibid at para 24.
Ibid at para 55 (emphasis in original).
Ibid at para. 83. In practice, the ‘‘tailoring” of a search meant that ‘‘generally, even when
a cellphone search is permitted because it is truly incidental to the arrest, only recently
sent or drafted emails, texts, photos and the call log may be examined”: ibid at para. 76.
Ibid at para 134.
Ibid at 179.
Marakah, supra note 43 at para 15.
Ibid.
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this electronic conversation (because he participated in the conversation); (3) the
accused subjectively expected that this conversation would remain private; and
(4) this expectation was reasonable. Chief Justice McLachlin excluded the iPhone
evidence and acquitted the accused.
In R. v. Reeves, the accused’s recently estranged common-law wife provided
a shared household computer to the police, which was found to contain child
pornography.61 The subject matter of the search was found to be ‘‘the computer,
and ultimately the data it contained about [the accused’s] usage, including the
files he accessed, saved and deleted.”62 In other words, ‘‘the police were not after
the physical device (to collect fingerprints on it, for example).” 63 Justice
Karakatsanis found that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the data contained on the shared computer, and that the accused’s wife’s decision
to provide the computer to police did not waive his privacy rights. The computer
evidence was excluded and the accused was acquitted.
R. v. Mills is notable because, after a period of expansion, the Supreme Court
finally appears to have reached an outer limit as to an accused’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.64 In that case, a police officer, posing as a 14-year-old
girl, communicated with the accused over the internet in the course of a sting
operation. These internet communications were used as evidence to convict the
accused of child luring. Similar to Marakah, Justice Brown defined the subject
matter of the search to be ‘‘the electronic communications that took place on
Facebook ‘chat’ and over email.”65 However, unlike Marakah, Justice Brown
found that the accused’s subjective expectation of privacy was not objectively
reasonable, since ‘‘ adults cannot reasonably expect privacy online with children
they do not know.”66 In a concurring opinion, Justice Karakatsanis also found
that the accused’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable, since ‘‘it is not
reasonable to expect that your messages will be kept private from the intended
recipient (even if the intended recipient is an undercover officer).” 67 The internet
evidence was allowed and the accused’s conviction was upheld.
Professor Steve Coughlan has observed that the most important part of the
four-part test delineating an accused’s reasonable expectation of privacy appears
to be the first — the definition of the ‘‘subject matter of the search” (or ‘‘what the
police were really after”) — such that, once this occurs, ‘‘the rest of the argument
flows largely lockstep.”68 For example, in Marakah, it would have been difficult
60
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Ibid at para. 17.
Reeves, supra note 44.
Ibid at para 30.
Ibid at para. 31.
Mills, supra note 43.
Ibid at para. 14.
Ibid at para. 23.
Ibid at para. 36.
Steve Coughlan, ‘‘Case Comment: R v. Marakah,” accessible through Westlaw Next
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for the accused to establish a privacy interest in the ‘‘subject matter” of his
accomplice’s iPhone (the accused, after all, did not own, or control, that iPhone).
However, the accused was able to establish a privacy interest in the ‘‘electronic
conversation” that was contained on his accomplice’s iPhone. In short, when
assessing searches of ‘‘electronic devices,” the Supreme Court has chosen to
emphasize the ‘‘electronic” and deemphasize the ‘‘device.” In many cases, it may
no longer be sufficient to consider whether a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists in a device as a whole; rather, it may be necessary to consider whether a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the component parts, functions, or
categories of information contained within the device.

5. CRITIQUE OF THE EARLY INTERPRETATIONS:
ELECTRONIC DEVICES ARE NOT ‘‘GOODS”
In light of the Supreme Court’s recent approach to police searches of
electronic devices, the lower court decisions expressing the view that searches of
electronic devices are equivalent to first-level searches of ‘‘goods” (Leask,
Whittaker, Appleton, Morosz, and Buss) have been widely criticized. Professor
Robert Currie has observed that ‘‘[d]espite the overall lower expectation of
privacy at the border, computers are not truly ‘goods’ as that term is defined in
the Customs Act, are not analogous to suitcases, handbags, or purses, and need
to be treated with greater attention to the privacy interest attached to them.” 69
Daniel Therrien, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, has stated that the ‘‘idea
that electronic devices should be considered as mere goods and therefore be
subject to border searches without legal grounds is clearly outdated and does not
reflect the realities of modern technology.”70 And the Canadian Bar Association
has taken the position that ‘‘[i]nformation stored on an electronic device is not a
‘Good’ — and any interpretation of the Customs Act that would authorize a
warrantless search of data stored on a device would likely be unconstitutional.” 71
The Canadian Border Services Agency (‘‘CBSA”) has maintained the legal
position that an electronic device is a ‘‘good” for the purposes of the Customs Act
1986.72 However, in practice, internal CBSA guidelines direct that an
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Canada, 2017 CarswellOnt 19342; Steve Coughlan, ‘‘Case Comment: R v. Reeves,”
accessible through Westlaw Next Canada, 2018 CarswellOnt 20931.
Currie, supra note 6 at 307.
House of Commons, Protecting Canadians’ Privacy at the US Border: Report of the
Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics (December 2017)
(Chair: Bob Zimmer) at 9 [HOC Standing Committee].
Canadian Bar Association, Privacy of Canadians at Airports and Borders (September
2017) at 2, online: < http://cba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=04e96564-b5b6441b-b6de-20b3e0874975> [CBA].
R. v. Gibson, 2017 BCPC 237, 2017 CarswellBC 2306 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) at paras. 55-63
[Gibson]; Vaillancourt v. Her Majesty et al, 2017 MBQB 95, 2017 CarswellMan 240 (Man.
Q.B.) at para. 2.
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examination of a ‘‘digital device” should ‘‘not be conducted as a matter of
routine,” but rather ‘‘if there is a multiplicity of indicators that evidence of
contraventions may be found on the digital device or media.”73 Customs officers
should ‘‘disable wireless and Internet activity,” should ‘‘only examine what is
stored within the device,” and should begin with a search that is ‘‘cursory in
nature and increase in intensity based on emerging indicators.” 74 Customs
officers should also take notes with respect to ‘‘the indicators that led to the
progressive search” as well as ‘‘what areas of the device or media were accessed
during the search.”75
More recently, lower courts have begun to appreciate that section 99(1) may
be vulnerable to a Charter challenge with respect to searches of electronic
devices.76 In R. v. Gibson,77 Judge Gillespie of the British Columbia Provincial
Court provided a useful summary of testimony given by customs officers about
their practices respecting device searches. In that case, the accused, Mr. Gibson,
attempted to enter Canada while carrying a cellphone, camera, and laptop. He
exhibited ‘‘indicators” that caused him to be referred to secondary inspection 78
73
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78

Canadian Border Services Agency, ‘‘Operational Bulletin: PRG-2015-31: Examination
of Digital Devices and Media at the Port of Entry - Interim Guidelines” (30 June 2015) at
1, online: <https://www.lexsage.com/documents/CBSA%20Operational%20Bulletin%20PRG-2015-31%20Examination%20of%20Digital%20Devices%20and%20Media%20at%20Port%20of%20Entry.pdf> [CBSA Guidelines]; Robert Diab,
‘‘Protecting the Right to Privacy in Digital Devices: Reasonable Search on Arrest and
at the Border” (2018) 69 U.N.B.L.J. 96 at 115; Meghan McDermott, Tamir Israel & Greg
McMullen, Electronic Devices Privacy Handbook: A Guide to Your Rights at the Border
(Vancouver: British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, 2018) at 9 [BCCLA]; HOC
Standing Committee, supra note 78 at 5. As per Diab and the BCCLA, the CBSA
Guidelines were current as of at least February 2017. The HOC Standing Committee,
which heard evidence from the CBSA, appeared to treat the CBSA Guidelines as current
as of the date of its report, December 2017. .
CBSA Guidelines, supra note 73 at 3.
Ibid.
See BCCLA, supra note 73 at 12. In United States of America v. Amadi, 2017 ONSC 3446,
2017 CarswellOnt 8874 (Ont. S.C.J.), the applicants sought disclosure of customs
officers’ notes in the course of extradition proceedings. The Ontario Superior Court of
Justice allowed the disclosure on the basis that there was an ‘‘air or reality” to the
accused’s argument that section 8 operated to limit customs searches (para 51). In R v.
Vaillancourt, supra note 80, the accused argued that the cursory search of his iPhone by
Canadian customs officers, which revealed child pornography, violated his Charter
rights. In light of the decision in Fearon, the trial judge ‘‘found there was an inconsistency
between s.99(1)(a) of the Customs Act and s.8 of the Charter,” and therefore ‘‘imposed
restrictions to the manner in which the section applies to electronic devices” (para 8).
However, Crown successfully appealed this decision on the basis that the Crown did not
receive proper notice of the Charter argument (and the text of earlier decision of the trial
judge appears to be unavailable).
Gibson, supra note 72.
See Currie, supra note 6 at 299, noting the CBSA’s own use of the terms ‘‘primary” and
‘‘secondary” inspection does not correspond with the search levels outlined in Simmons
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(such as the fact that he was carrying commercial photography equipment
although he claimed not be working in Canada). Mr. Gibson interacted with
several different customs officers in the course of his secondary inspection. One
officer testified that ‘‘there were no limitations on what he could look for in
reviewing the phone or camera. He was free to look at intimate pictures of people
on phones and in media on other devices.”79 Another officer testified that he
‘‘did not have a specific practice about how far back he scrolls in the messages”
and that he ‘‘looks at the photos and videos that are stored on the device.” 80 Yet
another officer testified that he ‘‘regularly” inspected cellphones as part of a
‘‘routine Customs examination,” although he commenced his search by ‘‘putting
the phone in airplane mode, so there are no incoming or outgoing calls.” 81
Despite this last officer’s apparent practice, the court heard technical evidence
that Mr. Gibson’s cellphone was not actually put into airplane mode during its
inspection.82 The customs officers discovered child pornography in the course of
their search. At trial, Mr. Gibson argued that section 99(1) violated section 8 of
the Charter, and Judge Gillespie held a voir dire on the issue.
While Judge Gillespie accepted the Crown’s argument that electronic devices
were ‘‘goods” for the purposes of the Customs Act 1986, he also read-in certain
limits to section 99(1) in light of Morelli, Vu, and Fearon. He concluded that a
first-level customs search of an electronic device must (a) be conducted for a valid
customs purpose, (b) be limited to data stored on the device, (c) not involve
seizure or full forensic search of the device, and (d) be terminated once
contraband is located.83 As such, Judge Gillespie concluded that section 99(1)
was constitutionally valid for the purposes of Mr. Gibson’s trial.

6.

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

Several proposals have been advanced to address the perceived deficiencies in
the Customs Act 1986 with respect to searches of electronic devices. These
proposals can be lumped into three broad categories: (a) banning device searches,
(b) requiring a warrant or exigent circumstances before initiating device searches,
or (c) requiring that custom officers have ‘‘reasonable suspicion” of a
contravention before initiating device searches.

79
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(as will be familiar to most travellers). In most cases, a referral to ‘‘secondary inspection”
involves ‘‘a more detailed conversation and search of an individual’s belongings,” and
thus will fall within the ambit of a first-level search contemplated by Simmons.
Gibson, supra note 72 at para 11.
Ibid at para. 22.
Ibid at paras. 15—16.
Ibid at para. 30.
Ibid at paras. 182—189.
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Banning Device Searches

Professor Steven Penney argues that it is ‘‘wrong to equate digital
information with contraband,” and that, rather than ‘‘further the objectives of
border control,” customs searches of electronic devices instead ‘‘give the state
back door access to intensely private information that it could not otherwise
obtain.”84 For example, in most child pornography cases, it seems to be a legal
fiction that attempts were made to ‘‘import” illicit images into Canada. 85 Rather,
illicit images appear to have been downloaded from the internet without much
regard for borders. If the state wishes to fight child pornography, it should do so
through traditional law enforcement channels (which usually require a warrant),
rather than the pretext of customs searches. Accordingly, Professor Penney
proposes that digital data ‘‘should remain off limits for searches authorized
under border control legislation.”86

b.

Requiring a Warrant or Exigent Circumstances

Professor Robert Diab reiterates Professor Penney’s concerns. However, he
allows that customs officers should have authority to conduct device searches in
rare cases. Taking inspiration from Justice Karakatsanis’s dissent in Fearon,
Professor Diab proposes that the Customs Act 1986 be amended ‘‘to allow for a
device search only with a warrant on probable grounds, except in exigent
circumstances.”87 Exigent circumstances would include (a) a reasonable
suspicion of imminent harm, or (b) a reasonable belief of imminent danger of
destruction of evidence.

c.

Reasonable Suspicion

Professor Currie proposes three ‘‘modest” changes: (a) the search of an
electronic device ‘‘should only occur if the CBSA officer has a reasonable
suspicion88 that contraband is being smuggled or some other statutory breach
has occurred/is under way”; (b) CBSA officers should keep ‘‘detailed notes of
84
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Steven Penney, ‘‘‘Mere Evidence’? Why Customs Searches of Digital Devices Violate
Section 8 of the Charter” (2016) 49:1 U.B.C. L. Rev. 485 at 510—511 [Penney].
See Diab, supra note 73 at 122, expanding on Penney’s point: ‘‘Obviously, the vast
majority of illicit data that enters Canada does so through the internet. A cursory glance
of the cases on device searches at the border will show that most involve accused persons
of seemingly limited technical savvy caught in possession of small amounts of child
pornography.”
Penney, supra note 84 at 514.
Diab, supra note 73 at 123.
See Steven Penney, ‘‘Standards of Suspicion” (2017) 65 Crim. L.Q. 23 at 36—41:
Historically, courts did not recognize a difference between the standards of ‘‘reasonable
suspicion” and ‘‘reasonable and probable grounds.” However, beginning in the 1970’s,
courts began to define reasonable suspicion as having a lower probability threshold than
reasonable and probable grounds. This lower standard was confirmed to be ‘‘constitutionally reasonable” with the advent of the Charter. The standard of reasonable
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what they have examined”; (c) the search should be ‘‘limited to the more basic
apps on the device — sent and draft emails and texts, photos, call logs, notetaking apps and anything similar,” whereas ‘‘any search of the device exceeding
this ‘cursory’ search, such as forensic analysis or mirroring the hard drive, would
require reasonable and probable grounds and a warrant.”89
At the time that Professor Currie made his suggestions, the CBSA Guidelines
respecting electronic device searches had not been made public.90 As indicated
above, the CBSA Guidelines already contain provisions with respect to (b)
limiting the scope of searches and (c) notetaking. In 2017, the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics
(‘‘ETHI”) recommended that the CBSA Guidelines be ‘‘written into the Customs
Act.”91 Mirroring Professor Currie, the ETHI also recommended that the CBSA
‘‘multiplicity of indicators” approach to authorizing device searches be replaced
with the legal standard of ‘‘reasonable grounds to suspect.”
Notably, at least one American court has recently endorsed a ‘‘reasonable
suspicion” standard for devices searches by customs officers (although it is
outside the scope of this paper to provide a detailed commentary on the
American jurisprudence). In Alasaad v. Nielsen,92 eleven plaintiffs alleged,
amongst other things, that border searches of their electronic devices had
violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The government conceded that
‘‘advanced searches” (i.e. attaching a device, through a wired or wireless
connection, to external equipment) required a standard of reasonable suspicion,
although the government also argued that ‘‘basic searches” (i.e. not attaching a
device to external equipment) could be performed without suspicion. 93 Judge
Casper disagreed, finding that the standard of ‘‘reasonable suspicion” (defined as
‘‘a showing of specific and articulable facts, considered with reasonable
inferences drawn from those facts, that the electronic devices contain
contraband”) should be required for both advanced and basic searches, given
that both searches implicated the same privacy interests. 94 Notably, Judge
Casper specifically rejected the argument that device searches required a warrant.
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suspicion has been expressed in phrases such as ‘‘reasonable cause to suspect,” ‘‘suspects
on reasonable grounds” (section 98), or ‘‘reasonable cause to suppose” (section 144).
Currie, supra note 6 at 308—314.
Ibid at 320.
HOC Standing Committee, supra note 68 at 10—11.
Alasaad v. Nielsen, 2019 WL 5899371 (U.S. Dist. Ct., D. Mass., 12 November 2019)
[Alasaad]. The plaintiffs brought their suit with the assistance of the American Civil
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Ibid at 2.
Ibid at 15.
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ASSESSING THE PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

Professor Penney makes an important point about the worldwide
accessibility of illicit material through the internet. However, it seems likely
that there will continue to be cases where it will be appropriate to treat digital
information as contraband. For example, consider the case of a person who
attempts to bring illicit digital images into Canada in an offline storage system
(such as an external hard drive or flash drive), perhaps specifically to evade
detection by Canadian internet service providers.95 Or the case of a person who
has created illicit digital images using a smartphone or camera, without the
intention of uploading or sharing those images over the internet. 96 More
significantly, there will continue to be cases where digital information will be
evidence of a contravention of customs law (rather than contraband itself).97 As
society’s use of technology increases, the use of technology to coordinate illicit
activity will also increase. As Justice Cromwell noted in Fearon, cellphones are
the ‘‘bread and butter of the drug trade,” and it stands to reason that this
includes the drug trade over international borders.98 Accordingly, it seems
reasonable that customs officers should have some ability to search devices. The
key seems to be articulating reasonable limits on this ability.
Professor Diab offers an attractive solution with his suggestion that a
customs search of an electronic device should require either a warrant or exigent
circumstances. However, this proposal would impose a higher standard for a
device search than for a strip search (an issue that Professor Diab himself
acknowledges).99 This sits uneasily not only with Justice Cromwell’s majority
view, expressed in Fearon, that a device search is ‘‘not as invasive as a strip
search,” but also with Justice Karakatsanis’s dissenting view, also expressed in
Fearon, that there seems to be some equivalence between a device search and a
strip search.100
Professor Currie’s suggestion that a device searches should be accompanied
by detailed notetaking seems reasonable. As indicated above, this practice
appears to have been substantially incorporated into the current CBSA
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See Whittaker, supra note 39. Although the decision does not explain where the accused
originally obtained the child pornography that was found on his devices, he attempted to
enter Canada with ‘‘two portable computers as well as a bag which contained a number
of external hard drives or mass storage devices,” which were found to contain a vast
quantity of pornographic images (paras 3, 5).
See Gibson, supra note 72. Customs agents searched the accused’s digital camera,
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See Appleton, supra note 40; Fearon, supra note 44. In those cases, device searches
revealed text messages showing illegal activity.
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Guidelines. In addition, Professor Currie’s suggestion that device searches should
be limited in scope to ‘‘basic” functions also seems reasonable, and this practice
appears to have been partially incorporated into the current CBSA Guidelines.
As indicated above, customs officers are instructed to disable wireless activity,
examine only what is stored on the device, and only increase the ‘‘intensity” of
the search if ‘‘emerging indicators” are found to justify doing so. It remains
unclear at what point customs officers may begin to attach external equipment to
a device for the purpose of data retrieval or forensic analysis (i.e. an ‘‘advanced
search” in the language of Alasaad). I agree with Professor Currie, in contrast to
Alasaad, that the attachment of external equipment to an electronic device
should be viewed as sufficiently invasive so as to require a warrant. 101
Furthermore, emphasizing the ‘‘cursory” nature of a device search that can
be performed on the basis of reasonable suspicion should go at least some way to
alleviating the concerns of commentators such as Professor Penny and Professor
Diab. To the extent that a device contains highly sensitive or confidential
information (such as a lawyer’s privileged work product or detailed financial
records), this information should be viewed as falling outside of a cursory search.
If it is really necessary for a customs officer, in the course of investigating a
potential customs violation, to look beyond the ‘‘basic” functions of a device
(being emails, text messages, photographs, note-taking apps, and the like), then
the officer should be required to obtain a warrant. Notably, this approach to
device searches (contrasted to an ‘‘all or nothing” approach) would seem to
comport reasonably well with the Supreme Court of Canada’s emphasis on
assessing the privacy interests that attach to categories of information, rather
than assessing the privacy interests that attach to categories of devices.
Professor Currie’s final suggestion, that customs officers form a ‘‘reasonable
suspicion” of a contravention before initiating a device search, also appears to be
reasonable. This is, after all, the current legal standard for strip searches
pursuant to section 98. In addition, the standard of ‘‘reasonable suspicion” is
similar to the current CBSA Guidelines, which direct that customs officers look
to a ‘‘multiplicity of indicators.”
101

Currie, supra note 6 at 312—317. Notably, Professor Currie appears to make a
distinction between the use of external equipment to perform a forensic analysis or
‘‘mirror” a device’s hard drive (p 312), and the use of external equipment to ‘‘crack” a
password (p 314-317). He concludes that a traveller likely has the right to refuse to
provide a device password, but that customs officers likely have the right to confiscate
and ‘‘crack” a device password if they have formed (only) a reasonable suspicion of a
customs violation. It is not essential, for the purposes of this paper, to provide an opinion
on this particular point. However, I note that one finding open to the Court is (a) a
traveller has the right to refuse to provide any password relating to a device, and (b)
customs officers must obtain a warrant to crack any password relating to a device.
Another finding is that (a) a traveller has the right to refuse to provide any password
relating to a device, and (b) customs officers have a right to crack only the device
password, on the basis of reasonable suspicion, for the purpose of performing a cursory
search.
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That being said, the case of Gibson should serve as a warning sign that the
changes proposed by Currie may not go far enough. In that case, the customs
officers appeared to be unaware of, or perhaps indifferent to, the current CBSA
Guidelines.102 They described device searches with a surprisingly casual attitude
— occurring as matter of ‘‘routine,” without a ‘‘specific practice,” and with ‘‘no
limitations.” While this attitude would undoubtedly be mitigated if the CBSA
Guidelines were given the force of law, there seems to be a deeper issue. Three
years earlier, in Fearon, Justice Karakatsanis predicted a similar issue arising
with respect to device searches incident to arrest: ‘‘I doubt not that police officers
[. . .] would act in good faith, but I do not think that they are in the best position
to determine ‘with great circumspection’ whether the law enforcement objectives
clearly outweigh the potential significant intrusion on privacy in the search of a
personal cellphone or computer.”103 In other words, it is problematic for customs
officers, acting as investigators, to also have complete discretion over whether
their investigations meet the appropriate legal standards.

8. A NEW PROPOSAL: DEVICE SEARCHES ARE PERSONAL
SEARCHES
In Hunter, Justice Dickson found that weighing individual and state interests
in the search and seizure context involved consideration of three procedural
safeguards: (a) prior authorization, (b) judicial authorization, and (c) objective
standards. Adopting a ‘‘reasonable suspicion” standard for frontline device
searches at customs, as well as limiting the scope of such searches, helps to
establish objective standards. Notetaking is undoubtedly a good practice,
although it seems to be aimed primarily at having a clear record to assess
decision making after a search has already been executed.104
A robust approach to protecting individual privacy interests at the border
should consider all three procedural safeguards, not only objective standards.
My own modest proposal is that a customs device search be treated as a section
98 ‘‘search of the person” as opposed to a section 99 ‘‘examination of goods.” In
addition to requiring (a) that a customs officer has ‘‘reasonable suspicion” that
an individual has contravened customs law in order to initiate a device search,
this proposal will also provide an individual with (b) the right to a limited review
of a customs officer’s decision to initiate a search and (c) the right to counsel.
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Diab, supra note 73 at 117. Diab points out that while the searches of the accused’s
devices in Gibson occurred prior to the implementation of the CBSA Guidelines, the
customs officers involved gave evidence as to their current search practices at trial, after
the CBSA Guidelines had been implemented.
Fearon, supra note 44 at para. 172.
Hunter, supra note 1 at para 27.
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The Equivalence of Privacy Interests

In Fearon, Justice Cromwell found that while ‘‘[a] cell phone search engages
very significant informational privacy interests,” it is ‘‘not as invasive as a strip
search.”105 This is a reference to the famous distinction between ‘‘personal
privacy, territorial privacy, and informational privacy,” whereby personal
privacy has been described as having ‘‘perhaps the strongest claim to
constitutional shelter” because of its connection to human dignity. 106
However, it is also important to remember that while the ‘‘distinction between
personal, territorial and informational privacy provides useful analytical tools [
. . .] in a given case, the privacy interest may overlap the categories.” 107
In the case of a second level customs search (i.e. a ‘‘strip or skin-search”), 108
‘‘[o]fficers do not touch the subject, [and] the subject obviously doesn’t touch the
officers.”109 In other words, the subject is asked to remove articles of clothing, in
a private area, in the presence of a customs officer. This differs markedly from a
third level customs search (i.e. a ‘‘body cavity search”),110 or a collection of
bodily samples,111 where the subject is physically probed or manipulated by an
agent of the state.
In the case of a device search, even a cursory device search, a customs officer
can expect to find a large quantity of intensely personal information that speaks
directly to a person’s ‘‘biographical core.” Notably, a 2015 study of American
adults aged 18 to 82 found that 87.80% of participants had ‘‘sexted” in their
lifetime, while 82.20% had done so in the last year.112 And not only is sexting a
very common practice, it can also, apparently, be a healthy practice. The study’s
author remarked that the ‘‘findings show a robust relationship between sexting
and sexual and relationship satisfaction.”113 Notably, in Gibson, Judge Gillespie
remarked that Mr. Gibson had ‘‘naked photos of himself on his iPhone,”
although customs officers testified they had no interest in those photos, ‘‘other
than to scroll through them in the search for other items.”114
105
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It is misleading to characterize viewing a person in the state of undress as an
issue of ‘‘personal privacy,” while viewing pictures of a person in a state of
undress on a cellphone as an issue of ‘‘informational privacy.” The dignity
interest involved — not to be viewed in a state of undress by a stranger — is
nearly identical in both cases. It would also be misleading to characterize
‘‘sexting” as an anomalous or deviant behaviour (such that a person might
deserve to be exposed for daring to use a cellphone in such a way). In short, a
customs officer should not be permitted to casually ‘‘scroll through” a person’s
‘‘naked photos,” just as they should not be permitted to casually request that a
person remove their clothing. A recognition that a device search is analogous to a
section 98 ‘‘search of the person” would apply matching procedural protections
to matching dignity interests.

b.

Review of a Custom Officer’s Decision to Search

Sections 98(2) and 98(3) provide that a traveller who is subject to a ‘‘search
of the person” may request to be taken before ‘‘the senior officer at the place
where the search is to take place,” who shall, ‘‘if he sees no reasonable grounds
for the search, discharge the person.” This provision should also apply to device
searches, which would provide at least some oversight of a custom officer’s
judgment as to whether sufficient grounds exist to initiate a search.
That being said, there remains a question as to whether the protection
afforded by way of the section 98 review procedure is sufficient (either in the
existing case of strip-searches or the proposed case of device searches). As noted
above, section 144 of the Customs Act 1970 provides that a person can request to
be taken before ‘‘a police magistrate or justice of the peace, or before the
collector or chief officer at the port or place.” In R. v. Williams, the Ontario
District Court found that ‘‘s. 144 intentionally provides a means for a person to
appear before a judicial person if he or she wishes to do so,” meaning that a
traveller could choose between any of the three different types of reviewer. 115
New sections 98(2) and 98(3) of the Customs Act 1986 remove the option to
request a review by a ‘‘judicial person” (such as a ‘‘police magistrate” or ‘‘justice
of the peace”). Instead, a review can only be done by a ‘‘senior officer.” It
appears that the CBSA has interpreted ‘‘senior officer” to mean a
‘‘superintendent”116 or a ‘‘person who is the airport director or a chief —
someone within senior management.”117
Recall that, in Hunter, Chief Justice Dickson found that it was not necessary
for a judge to authorize a search in all cases, as long as the authorizer was
capable of ‘‘acting judicially” or in a ‘‘neutral and impartial manner.” 118 But an
114
115
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118
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authorizer that exercised both investigatory and adjudicatory functions should
be viewed with caution. It seems obvious that a frontline customs officer would
not be able to satisfy the Hunter criteria — the frontline officer’s function as an
investigator could be expected to inhibit the officer’s ability to adjudicate, in a
‘‘neutral and impartial” manner, whether sufficient grounds existed so as to
initiate a device search. But more significantly, it is also unclear whether even the
reviewer of the frontline officer, as contemplated by the Customs Act 1986 (i.e.
the ‘‘senior officer” who, apparently, can simply be ‘‘someone with senior
management”), would be able satisfy the Hunter criteria. Making a
determination on this point would likely require more information as to the
reviewer’s position, training, and experience.
In any event, it is concerning that a review by a more obvious ‘‘judicial
person” (specifically a ‘‘justice of the peace”) was viewed as feasible for the
purposes of section 144 of the Customs Act 1970, only to be dropped with the
introduction of section 98 of the Customs Act 1986. In Simmons, Chief Justice
Dickson specifically found that section 144 was constitutionally valid (although
the choice between different types of reviewers was not an issue that was before
the court).119 The Supreme Court has not yet been asked to opine on whether the
reduced right of review now articulated in section 98 is constitutionally valid. I
suggest that it may not be, and that defence counsel may be wise to challenge
section 98 on this basis. In addition, Judges and lawmakers should consider
whether changes should be made to section 98 in order to bring it in line with
Hunter.

c.

The Right to Counsel

In Simmons, Chief Justice Dickson found that when Ms. Simmons was
required to undergo a strip-search, she was detained for the purposes section 10
of the Charter, which triggered her right to speak to counsel. Building on
Simmons, subsequent decisions have broadly construed the definition of
‘‘detention” for the purposes of section 10. In R. v. Jones, the Ontario Court
of Appeal remarked that while ‘‘routine questioning and inspection of luggage at
the border does not result in detention,” if a customs officer has decided,
‘‘because of some sufficiently strong particularized suspicion, to go beyond
questioning of a person and to engage in a more intrusive form of inquiry, it may
well be that the individual is detained when subject to that routine
questioning.”120 Similarly, in R. v. Darlington, the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice remarked that ‘‘constitutional interests of self-incrimination and right to
counsel become engaged where the generality and routineness of the screening
exercise give way to more specific and intrusive measures.”121
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Since any section 98 search (either in the existing case of strip-searches or the
proposed case of device searches) should require that a customs officer form
‘‘reasonable suspicion” of a contravention, I suggest that any section 98 search
should be considered a ‘‘more intrusive form of inquiry” sufficient to trigger
section 10. In short, as with a strip search, a person should be given the
opportunity to speak to counsel prior to the initiation of a device search.
In the case of a strip search, a traveller who wishes to speak to counsel prior
to the initiation of a search is usually directed to telephone ‘‘duty counsel.” 122 In
the case of a device search, duty counsel would be able to provide a traveller with
valuable advice, such as the scope of the search to be expected (i.e. the device
should be placed in ‘‘airplane mode”),123 whether a device password must be
provided to customs officers,124 whether access should be provided to a device
that contains privileged or confidential information, 125 or what the consequences
may be for refusing to provide access to a device.126

9.

CONCLUSION

The foundational search and seizure cases of Hunter and Simmons did not
contemplate the digital age. However, these cases did outline important
procedural protections that are still relevant today. It is not reasonable, and
likely not constitutionally permissible, to treat devices simply as ‘‘goods.” At the
same time, it is likely not reasonable for travellers to expect absolute privacy at
the border with regard to their electronic devices. What is reasonable is an
approach that is sensitive to both legitimate privacy interests of travellers and
legitimate state interests to maintain border security. The proposal to treat device
searches as section 98 personal searches is such an approach, which charts a
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course not only between competing privacy interests but also between the
existing proposals for change.
What should go through your mind at customs? You should be cognizant
that a customs officer could initiate a search of your body or your devices. But
you should also feel confident that the customs officer would need some grounds
to suspect that you had contravened customs law before engaging in such
searches. In short, you should feel confident that your privacy will be respected.
And you should feel lucky to be returning to a country that takes the dignity of
its citizens seriously.
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Appendix
Customs Act, RSC 1970, c C-40 (the “Customs Act 1970”)
133. (1) Every such officer or person as mentioned in section 132, and every
sheriff, justice of the peace, or person residing more than ten miles from the
residence of any officer and thereunto authorized by any collector or justice of
the peace, may, upon information, or upon reasonable grounds of suspicion,
detain, open and examine any package suspected to contain prohibited
property or smuggled goods, or goods respecting which there has been any
violation of any of the requirements of this Act, and may go on board and
enter into any vessel or vehicle of any description whatever, and may stop and
detain the same, whether arriving from places beyond or within the limits of
Canada, and may rummage and search all parts thereof for such goods.
(2) If any such goods are found in any such vessel or vehicle, the officer or
person so employed may seize and secure such vessel or vehicle together with
all the sails, rigging, tackle, apparel, horses, harness and all other appurtenances that, at the time of such seizure, belong to or are attached to such
vessel or vehicle, with all goods and other things laden therein or thereon.
[. . .]
SEARCH OF THE PERSON
143. Any officer, or person by him authorized thereunto, may search any
person on board any vessel or boat within any port in Canada, or on or in any
vessel, boat or vehicle entering Canada by land or inland navigation, or any
person who has landed or got out of such vessel, boat or vehicle, or who has
come into Canada from a foreign country in any manner or way, if the officer
or person so searching has reasonable cause to suppose that the person
searched has goods subject to entry at the customs, or prohibited goods,
secreted about his person.
144. (1) Before any person can be searched, the person may require the officer
to take him before a police magistrate or justice of the peace, or before the
collector or chief officer at the port or place, who shall, if he sees no
reasonable cause for search, discharge the person, but, if otherwise, he shall
direct the person to be searched; but where the person is a female she shall be
searched by a female, and any such magistrate, justice of the peace or collector
may, if there is no female appointed for such purpose, employ and authorize a
suitable female person to act in any particular case or cases.
(2) Every officer required to take any person before a police magistrate, justice
of the peace, or chief officer as aforesaid, shall do so with all reasonable
dispatch.
Customs Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (2nd Supp) [formerly Customs Act, SC 1986 c 1] (the
“Customs Act 1986”)
Definitions
2(1) In this Act,
[. . .]
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goods, for greater certainty, includes conveyances, animals and any document
in any form;
[. . .]
PART VI
ENFORCEMENT
POWERS OF OFFICERS
Search of the person
98 (1) An officer may search
(a) any person who has arrived in Canada, within a reasonable time after
his arrival in Canada,
(b) any person who is about to leave Canada, at any time prior to his
departure, or
(c) any person who has had access to an area designated for use by persons
about to leave Canada and who leaves the area but does not leave Canada,
within a reasonable time after he leaves the area,
if the officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the person has secreted on or
about his person anything in respect of which this Act has been or might be
contravened, anything that would afford evidence with respect to a contravention of this Act or any goods the importation or exportation of which is
prohibited, controlled or regulated under this or any other Act of Parliament.
Person taken before senior officer
(2) An officer who is about to search a person under this section shall, on the
request of that person, forthwith take him before the senior officer at the place
where the search is to take place.
Idem
(3) A senior officer before whom a person is taken pursuant to subsection (2)
shall, if he sees no reasonable grounds for the search, discharge the person or,
if he believes otherwise, direct that the person be searched.
Search by same sex
(4) No person shall be searched under this section by a person who is not of
the same sex, and if there is no officer of the same sex at the place at which the
search is to take place, an officer may authorize any suitable person of the
same sex to perform the search.
Examination of goods
99 (1) An officer may
(a) at any time up to the time of release, examine any goods that have been
imported and open or cause to be opened any package or container of
imported goods and take samples of imported goods in reasonable
amounts;
(b) at any time up to the time of release, examine any mail that has been
imported and, subject to this section, open or cause to be opened any such
mail that the officer suspects on reasonable grounds contains any goods
referred to in the Customs Tariff, or any goods the importation of which is
prohibited, controlled or regulated under any other Act of Parliament,
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and take samples of anything contained in such mail in reasonable
amounts;
(c) at any time up to the time of exportation, examine any goods that have
been reported under section 95 and open or cause to be opened any
package or container of such goods and take samples of such goods in
reasonable amounts;
(c.1) at any time up to the time of exportation, examine any mail that is to
be exported and, subject to this section, open or cause to be opened any
such mail that the officer suspects on reasonable grounds contains any
goods the exportation of which is prohibited, controlled or regulated
under any Act of Parliament, and take samples of anything contained in
such mail in reasonable amounts;
(d) where the officer suspects on reasonable grounds that an error has
been made in the tariff classification, value for duty or quantity of any
goods accounted for under section 32, or where a refund or drawback is
requested in respect of any goods under this Act or pursuant to the
Customs Tariff, examine the goods and take samples thereof in reasonable
amounts;
(d.1) where the officer suspects on reasonable grounds that an error has
been made with respect to the origin claimed or determined for any goods
accounted for under section 32, examine the goods and take samples
thereof in reasonable amounts;
(e) where the officer suspects on reasonable grounds that this Act or the
regulations or any other Act of Parliament administered or enforced by
him or any regulations thereunder have been or might be contravened in
respect of any goods, examine the goods and open or cause to be opened
any package or container thereof; or
(f) where the officer suspects on reasonable grounds that this Act or the
regulations or any other Act of Parliament administered or enforced by
him or any regulations thereunder have been or might be contravened in
respect of any conveyance or any goods thereon, stop, board and search
the conveyance, examine any goods thereon and open or cause to be
opened any package or container thereof and direct that the conveyance
be moved to a customs office or other suitable place for any such search,
examination or opening.
(2) and (3) [Repealed, 2017, c. 7, s. 52]
Samples
(4) Samples taken pursuant to subsection (1) shall be disposed of in such
manner as the Minister may direct.
The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK),
1982, c 11, Part I, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”)
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
Fundamental Freedoms
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
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(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom
of the press and other media of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association.
[. . .]
LEGAL RIGHTS
Life, liberty and security of person
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.
Search or seizure
8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.
Detention or imprisonment
9. Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.
Arrest or detention
10. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention
(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor;
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that
right; and
(c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas
corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.
[. . .]
ENFORCEMENT
Enforcement of guaranteed rights and freedoms
24.(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have
been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to
obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances.
Exclusion of evidence bringing administration of justice into disrepute
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that
evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or
freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is
established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in
the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

